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Abstract
Smart services have potential to improve value
creation and profitability of industrial firms and their
customers. Defined as services that go beyond the
upkeep and upgrades, traditionally bundled with
products and helping companies to build intelligence—
that is, awareness and connectivity. Combined with
digitalization, services have had a major role in
improving efficiency of existing offering and enabling
new channels for service delivery.
Implementing the change toward smart services is
challenging. Research shows that especially industrial
companies maintain institutionalized beliefs and
attitudes impeding the transformation, lack capabilities
and resources for implementation, and face industrywide norms and relationship practices resisting the
change.
The study explores the barriers in adopting smart
services and is implemented as a multi-case study
among six globally operating industrial companies.
Our findings indicate classification of internal
barriers, capability gaps, and external barriers,
contributing a framework that describes the interplay
between
institutional
forces
and
capability
development in organizational change.

1.

Introduction

Smart industrial services [1], [2] are services that
are enabled and influenced by information that
different industrial devices and processes generate,
store and transmit to enable efficient operation,
optimization, analysis and integration of business
functions. Industrial services in general are often
classified into categories of maintaining (product)
functionality, ensuring operational availability,
maintaining and improving performance, integrating
processes, and operating production [3]. Each of these
categories is affected by digitalization [4].
While research has studied the service
transformation of industrial companies, few studies
have explored the impact of digitalization of industrial
services and moreover the institutional and
organizational barriers that might complicate the
comprehensive change. To fill the gap, this study
explores the barriers to the development, launch, and
implementation of smart services within manufacturing
organizations. To address our research objective, we
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conducted a qualitative multi-case study among six
globally operating industrial companies, which have
already made significant investments in smart service
development. The study was conducted as interviews
in different industrial sectors. The findings identify
three levels of barriers to the industry-wide adoption of
smart services. The findings also suggest strategies for
firms to overcome the barriers. The analysis illustrates
the interplay between institutional inertia and dynamic
capabilities during unfolding of the change. Further,
our results suggest ways and approaches for managers
to overcome the institutional and capability barriers.

2.

Theoretical Background

2.1

Barriers to change

Overtime, organizations build culture, identity, and
beliefs, which generally improve exploitation in stable
market conditions. Thornton et al [5] define
institutional logic as socially constructed sets of
material practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs that
shape cognition and behavior. The rules, norms, and
beliefs surrounding economic activity define of enforce
socially acceptable economic behavior [6]. Institutional
logics serve as the interpretation schema for
organizational actors, guiding their beliefs, attitudes,
decisions, and actions [7]. The institutional logics
include norms and values at the individual level,
organizational culture and politics at the organizational
level, and regulation and industry-side norms at
organizational level [6]. Institutions are products of
shared understanding of acceptable norms of activity
[8]. A change in the logic depends on the endorsement
of the new scheme of reasoning by the stakeholders
involved in the exchange [9], [10]. In the case of smart
services, the change requires a new identity supporting
the new business logic involving smart services.
Institutional literature argues that organizational
fields are organized by a dominant logic [9], and
institutional change is effectuated by a change in this
dominant logic. Institutional change is viewed as a
transition from one dominant logic to another [12].
Smart services fundamentally change the nature of
customer-supplier relationships by often re-defining
firm boundaries, introducing availability and
performance-based agreements, performance-based
pricing, and re-organizing firms’ resource and
capability base. Each of these changes potentially re-
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brands the identity of the firm and shakes their power
position toward the other business ecosystem members.
Hence, successful implementation of smart services
requires internal (organizational) and external
(organizational fields’) adoption of new institutional
logic.

2.2

Overcoming institutional barriers

A change of logic requires acceptance of the new
scheme of reasoning by the stakeholders [8], [9]. In the
case of smart services, such an endorsement requires
the perceived legitimacy of the new types of services
by the key stakeholders in both the customer and
supplier organizations. Suchman [10] defines
legitimacy as the generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. Pragmatic
legitimacy is based on the self-interested calculation of
an actor about the benefit or expected value of an
activity on the expected performance of the evaluator.
An organization may evaluate the legitimacy of smart
services on the basis of the value created for the service
provider. Conversely, moral legitimacy reflects a
normative evaluation of the activities or the
organization at large, whether or not the activity is
considered to be “the right thing to do”, and in line
with the identity of the organization. This involves
acknowledging the benefits of the logic for all actors
involved. In smart services the moral legitimacy can be
defined by the given service strategy. The cognitivecultural legitimacy depends upon the acceptance of the
logic, based on what is considered desirable by the
actors’ involved and other connected stakeholders that
may influence their evaluations. So in essence how
well does the given actor network follow the strategy
set for the smart services? To deal with these above
listed institutional barriers, the institutional change
literature suggests sensemaking and sensegiving as key
mechanisms for facilitating the transformation [11].
Sensemaking refers to the meanings managers and
employees construct during the attempted change of
the offering portfolio, and the ways it is understood
that the changes will affect the goals. Sensegiving on
the other hand is a related process by which individuals
attempt to influence the sensemaking of others toward
a preferred redefinition of the reality [11]. Based on the
research about legitimizing new schemes of
interpretation in decision-making, we suggest that both
organizational sensemaking and sensegiving play a key
role in the introduction of the smart services within
firms and organizational fields.

2.3
Renewing the resource and capability
base of a firm
Organizations employ dynamic capabilities [12] to
maintain and improve the match with market demands,
as well as the operational capabilities to produce high
quality products and services. Dynamic capability is
defined as an organization’s capacity to create, modify,

and extend its resource and capability base [12]. Two
different parameters for measuring the effectiveness of
dynamic capabilities are suggested, being the
evolutionary- and technical fitness [12].
Evolutionary fitness denotes and measures
organizations’ external fit with market demands and
opportunities [12], [13]. Organizations that have high
evolutionary fitness quickly adapt to emerging market
opportunities or effectuate opportunities by creating
and influencing market needs, or both. Evolutionary
fitness is achieved by customer and market insight,
learning, innovation, and successful introduction of
new products and services that capture the emerging
market opportunities. High evolutionary fitness may
provide at least a temporary competitive advantage
[14] unless other dynamic companies are equally quick
to adapt. Previous literature has identified key
capabilities and practices that support developing the
evolutionary fitness. Launching novel services require
careful customer selection, capabilities to gain
customer insight by value research [15], [16],
formulating the findings as value propositions [17],
quantifying and convincingly communicating the value
propositions, ability to engage and co-create value,
verify and share the value created [18], [19], and
leverage the outcome to effectuate an internal and
external cultural change [20].
Companies may try to improve their evolutionary
fitness either by adapting to current and predicted
market demands, or by influencing the market demands
in their favor [12]. Successful introduction of smart
services may require both approaches. Value research
driven discovery of new service opportunities or a
broader market foresight analysis supports systematic
development of likely valuable smart services, but a
wider market success requires active influencing of the
other business network members to increase the
pressure on them to achieve the change in their
institutional logic and resource and capability base.
Technical fitness [12], [13] denotes and measures
the quality of the (novel) products and services.
Technical fitness affects evolutionary fitness.
Companies may be quick to anticipate and/or create
market demand, but the products and services created
to service the demand may not meet customer
expectations, or the required quality may be too
expensive to achieve. Competitiveness then is the
product of both - the evolutionary fitness and the
technical fitness. Clearly an organization may excel in
both, either, or neither of the fitness categories. Inward
focused companies may excel in technical fitness, but
end up offering high quality products and services,
which the markets or consumers do not need. On the
other hand an innovative and market-focused company
may succeed in anticipating and responding to
emerging market needs, but fail to create offerings that
meet customer’s requirements. Long-term success
requires both.

3.

Methodology
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Our research was conducted as a multi-case study
among six prominent, globally operating European
industrial and technology companies. We investigated
the unfolding of smart services development and
rollout within its real-life context. The phenomenon
qualifies as contemporary and evolving, hence
justifying the exploratory approach chosen [21]. The
multi-case approach provided analytical benefits over a
single-case by enabling comparison and contrast of the
results to find the distinction of case specific findings
and the more general phenomena.

3.1

Context of the study and case selection

Industrial companies are expanding their scope of
business by service transformation [22], expanding
their offering from products to services and solutions,
building the required resources and capabilities, and
organizing accordingly. The drivers behind the
strategic move include commoditization of the existing
business, and promising future service business
opportunities in forms of sustainable relationships
enabled by the service offering. The transformation is
not new, Fang et al [23] found that on average the

share of service revenue rose from 8,9% in 1990 to
42,2% in 2005 among manufacturing companies.
All the case companies in our sample are
multinational companies. The case companies operate
in different industrial sectors and provide a wide range
of products and services to their customers with
varying degrees of service orientation. Studied
industrial fields include transportation systems,
measurement
engineering,
machine
industry,
agricultural engineering, building infrastructure, and
industry automation. The wide range of industries
provides valuable insights on smart service
transformation in different contexts. The case
companies were selected based on purposive sampling
[21]; all the case companies have been implementing
smart services. However, it was our aim to select
companies that were in different maturity phases in
their service transformation journey so that we could
identify the barriers that were proven to be able to
overcome as well as those that seemed to be only
context specific and unique for given firm. The details
of these case companies are described in Table 1.

Table 1. Case company descriptions
Firm

Industry

Alpha

Transportation
systems

Beta

Gamma

Sales

Staff

Smart service offering

>7
000

> 25

Commissioning, remote training, remote data transfer and handling, data
warehousing. Visualization of data, data evaluation, remote condition
diagnostics, performance contracting.

Measurement
Engineering

> 350

>2

Commissioning, remote training, remote system upgrades.

Machine Industry

>2
400

> 15

Service platform, commissioning, remote data transfer, remote system
upgrades, data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics, predictive
services, performance contracting, data based benchmarking, data based
consulting services.

Delta

Agricultural
engineering

>3
600

> 60

Service platform, commissioning, remote training, remote data transfer,
data warehousing, remote system upgrades, data visualization, data
evaluation, automated data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics,
predictive services, performance contracting, managed services, data
based benchmarking, data based consulting services.

Epsilon

Building
infrastructure

>9
000

>50

Service platform, remote data transfer, visualization of data, data
evaluation, automated data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics,
predictive services.

Zeta

Industrial products
and services

>6
000

>40

IT hardware, software, and services; also advanced services, e.g. managed
services for own and 3rd party hardware.

3.2

Data collection

The empirical data of this study consists of in-depth
interviews with experienced senior managers in our
case organizations. The interviews were carried out
between January and June 2016, and each interview
was between 40 to 100 minutes of length. The sample
size matches the recommendations for exploratory
research [28]. To enable the relaxed communication the
informants’ anonymity was guaranteed through the
assurance that the results would be released without
any identifying information. It was perceived that

anonymity encourages more candid discussion about
successes and failures. Each interview was recorded
and then transcribed verbatim. Following purposive
sampling [21], the interviewees were chosen based on
their role and experience, thereby most of them were
sales, product, and service managers. To avoid single
respondent bias, three or more managers were
interviewed at each firm.
After selecting the case companies and informants,
semi-structured interviews with predefined themes
were conducted; interview contents were continuously
adapted on the basis of previous interviews [24]. The
interviews consisted of open-ended questions, initially
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crafted based on the literature review, and then
modified and adjusted during the research process. All
interviews were conducted face-to-face, and the
transcribed data obtained from interviews was analyzed
continuously during the research process. This was
done in order to include or exclude the pre-defined
themes that didn’t seem to resonate with our initial
interview structure. Furthermore, after each interview,
the analysis of the interview was emailed to the
informant by email. The informant was invited to
correct any misunderstandings and add any information
that that he or she had forgot to mention during the
interview.
As case studies often apply abductive reasoning,
our research process followed this paradigm,
combining both inductive and deductive reasoning
[25], [26]. Our study design involved simultaneous
data collection and theory development, emphasizing
an active interplay between theory and empirical
evidence by going back and forth between the
framework, data sources, and analysis [25]. Thus the
objective of our approach was to match theory and
reality in a nonlinear, path-dependent combination of
empirical observations and theory. Hence, the research
process of this study unfolded as an iterative process,
characterized by the constant revision of the data
collected, aiming to categorize the data according to
the framework, which was initially derived from the
literature and continuously adapted in the course of the
research.
The primary analysis technique used was cross-case
synthesis, aggregating the findings of each case
through a cross-case analysis, and involving a careful
comparison of the findings from each case [27]. Thus,
the similar themes across the cases, the differences
among the cases, and the reasons for those differences
were analyzed, resulting in the identification of the
common themes that were perceived to be relevant in
this study.

3.3

Data analysis

Our data analysis followed an abductive analysis
process, where the understanding of the phenomenon
based on the literature laid the foundation for early
interviews, which then used evolving themes to track
important issues as the interviews progressed and our
understanding of smart services in the real-life setting
increased [25]. In practice, prior literature informed us
about the generic barriers relating to novel services
[22], and the interviews explored how these or other
emerging barriers were manifested in the case
companies. While prior literature guided the initial
analysis, we did not employ preconceived codes, but
relied on open coding, which used in-vivo labeling, and
described the emerging concepts based on the actual
language used by informants [28]. Specifically, we
coded both tangible activities and practices, as well as
more intangible beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes that
were considered to affect smart services, in order to be

as inclusive as possible in gaining a rich understanding
of the topic.
Our data analysis started from the early
observations [29], enabling us to structure our data into
consistent blocks that reflect the emerging patterns in
the data. This led to the identification of three
categories of barriers, relating to the internally induced
barriers, organizational capability gaps, and externally
induced barriers to smart services. During the process
we constantly revised our preliminary theory-based
ideas of meaningful categories of data with empirically
grounded insights of the barriers that impeded the
adoption of smart services. We organized the data by
using open and axial coding, and converting it to
discrete thematic blocks that described the different
types of barriers that the interviewed individuals
experienced, the characteristics of each barrier, and the
potential sense-making and sensegiving practices that
managers used to overcome those barriers [28].
The analysis progressed through a highly iterative
process, where the emerging findings were constantly
reflected and revised between and within the research
team and the informants at the case company. The
research team held several interim meetings, and
several managers from the case companies audited the
preliminary results and provided feedback during the
research. The frequent exposition of emergent results
to both managerial (deep and local, context-specific
knowledge) and academic (broad knowledge from
several contexts) audiences ensured that we had
reached sufficient understanding of the research
phenomenon and captured the breadth and depth of
how managers experienced the barriers in their own
social reality [30], [31].
Because qualitative case research is sensitive to
researchers’ subjective interpretations, we used a
variety of tactics to improve the quality of the research
and the trustworthiness of the findings [21], [32], [33].
First, we used theoretical sampling and revelatory case
logics to identify and gain access to empirical data that
would provide theoretically and contextually rich
insights in terms of the focal phenomenon. Second, we
applied several forms of triangulation (theory,
researcher, and data) to increase the credibility and
validity of the study. In practice, we combined
institutional and dynamic capabilities theories as our
analytical lenses, used multiple researchers as cointerpreters, and drew empirical insights from several
key informants, and different sources of data. Third, we
conducted frequent member checks and peer debriefing
to reduce researcher bias and increase the objectivity of
the study. Finally, by providing a rich set of direct
interview quotations to demonstrate interpretations, we
support the transparency and conformability of the
findings.

4.

Findings

Our analysis identified sixteen barriers to adoption
of the smart services, classified as internal barriers,
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capability gaps, and external barriers. The internal
barriers resist change of mindset, beliefs, and identity
[34]. The capability gaps represent the missing or weak
capabilities and resources needed to successfully
provide smart services i.e. meet the market
requirements. Finally, the external barriers relate to the
receptivity of the customers and the wider industrial
network for the smart services and the changes in the
relationship logic that the changes would bring about.
The identified barriers are discussed next.

4.1

Internal barriers

Our analysis revealed three basic themes of internal
barriers of which all reflects somehow the
organizational culture and management principles.
Services were seen to be very distinctive form the
traditional, exploitative business and therefore the
identity and legitimacy inhibited companies in their
transition.
Management culture: Our analysis revealed that
the existing management culture often favors and
rewards short-term achievements of product-based
offering. Smart services represent complicated and
difficult-to-evaluate offerings, for which the salescycles are long and outcomes risky. We find that the
management practices, goals and incentives reflect the
prevailing product-focused culture, which firmly
maintain the prevailing sales culture. The following
quotes illustrate this finding.
Internal marketing of the new service was an issue: The
service culture was not yet developed correctly. We were still
stuck in the mentality of being a product company. (Beta).
In addition, service technicians have to be included in
these new technologies through different wages, incentives.
(Delta)

Identity: Many of the case companies have
successful history and strong identity in their existing
business. The customer-facing personnel identify
themselves with the existing (mature and productdominated) offering portfolio.
Selling services is much different than selling products.
…We all (salespeople) are hired to sell products not
services." (Zeta).
Our smart service business grew organically; we had no
clear development process. Service just did not have a lot of
status at that time. (Beta).
It was a challenge and a struggle to convince people of
smart services – they are used to the predictable lifecycles of
products. Smart services with long product life seem
complicated in comparison. (Beta).

Legitimacy: Smart services often redefine the roles
and responsibilities within the supplier companies, and
expand the scope of the customer relationships. The
new services are not a legitimate part of the offering
portfolio or the relationship scope.
We are a mechanical engineering company with service,
not a service business. The service developed over time.
Because of this, the whole mindset is not service-driven, but
product-driven. We do have this problem. (Gamma).
Dealers would simply refuse to bill customers for services
they did not render at the customers’ site. (Delta).

People resist [Smart Services] since they are something
new, unknown. Something could happen, something could not
work. [...] Hence the argument, I only act if something is
truly broken. (Delta).
Maybe the change is also between the ears, that we
would sell something else than the traditional. (Zeta).
People have to be won over. The internal need for
discussions and marketing was much higher than expected
and severely underestimated. (Delta).
Mindset problem. The mindset problem comes with a
resource problem. We simply do not have enough Smart
Talents. (Gamma)

4.2

Capability gaps

As noted above, the organizational barriers were
not, however, limited only to the organizational culture
and identity but reflected also novel capabilities that
companies did not necessarily posses. The capability
gaps were mainly related to the technical problems and
level of communication between the stakeholders but
also the reconfiguration problems towards service
orientation were recognized.
Inability to provide smart services: Technical
immaturity or outdated technology of the existing
equipment fleet and incomplete support infrastructure
are among the key reason preventing case companies
from providing smart services.
Technical problems led to anxiety among our customers
and service technicians. [...] The worry, that systems break
down – no worry, that people fail, don’t know what to do
[...], but permanent worry about technology, that data gets
lost, that something is disrupted, that something breaks
down. (Delta).
When we started with Smart Services, we didn’t have
much to show. We only had few data and didn’t know if we
should wait until we had more substance [...] You enter this
vicious cycle [where the dealers say]: ‚Well, but I can only
talk with the customer when I have this and that feature.
(Delta).

Access to influence: Generally, selling innovative
new offerings requires access to influential and
visionary decision makers, who are receptive to the
benefits provided by the smart services. The existing
business contacts of the case companies are often built
to procurement units, which are not receptive to new
ideas.
The idea is to use key account managers that actively
address these issues with decision makers at the customers
and try to launch the whole thing. It’s definitely a challenge,
because you have to make new connections to stakeholders.
(Beta).

Governance infrastructure: The internal IT
systems, management systems, incentives, and
organizational structures are built overtime and
optimized for the existing product-based businesses.
The existing infrastructure has been built over time to
serve the existing business logic. As the requirements
of the smart services provision and the needed
capabilities and practices are significantly different, the
existing structures do not serve the emerging logic
well.
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Roles and responsibilities should have been clearly
defined much earlier. Initially, nobody knew who had what to
coordinate. (Delta).
It’s challenging in the product-oriented company where
all the processes and systems support product-orientation.
(Zeta).
In addition, service technicians have to be included in
these new technologies through different wages, incentives.
(Delta).
[When we started offering automated Smart Services] we
had to define new processes. [...] We had to make rules that a
ticket [initiated by a machine] gets treated the same way as if
the customer had called himself. (Gamma).
Initially we focused too intensely on the technical
solution. The whole application of Smart Services was put on
a level with the machine can send data. The typical way of
thinking was that if the machine can send data, the work is
done – and people will automatically take care of the data,
analyze it and know what to do. (Epsilon).
The only focus was the technical equipment that enabled
the machine to send data. [...] Everything else was not
considered – that you have to educate and inform people, that
perhaps new tools are needed, that new processes are
needed. That was all neglected. [...] This was surely the main
reason that the earliest projects were never successful.
(Epsilon)

Lack of resources: The case companies often lack
the necessary financial resources to implement the
infrastructure for smart services.
We only offer this [Smart Service] in markets, where we
have the necessary downstream processes in our service
organization well established. Nothing is more foolish than
having a [predictive call] from a machine and no one acts on
it. If this is the case, you lose more and faster than you can
ever win. [...] The process includes the necessary resources
you need to run it! If a market is too small, then we do not
offer [Smart Services]. [...] I promise the customer a lot, if I
cannot keep these promises I squander all trust. (Gamma).
We simply do not have enough Smart Talents, i.e.
personnel qualified for Smart Services. This resource
problem goes hand in hand with a usage problem. If I had
more customers for Smart Services, I could afford more
resources. At some point I have to make the decision whether
we believe [in Smart Services], then I have to commit
resources, even when I don’t have any usage. (Gamma)

Insufficient information on installed base: The
case companies often have a significant installed based,
but seldom sufficient and applicable installed base
information to efficiently leverage it.
Regarding complexity – what makes it [providing Smart
Services] difficult for us is the long life cycle [of our
products]. This makes it very difficult for us, this extreme
diversity in the installed base. [...]. There is this huge number
of components, where we cannot read out anything and do
not even know what is installed at all. (Epsilon)

Cost-Benefit of installed base modernization: Many
of the case companies have built their installed base
over time, and need to maintain outdated equipment. In
many cases the cost of upgrading the installed base to
support the smart services is prohibitively high.
[Smart Services were pushed by the top management with
the premise that no changes be necessary regarding
organization, infrastructure, or additional technical
equipment]. This had the disadvantage that we didn’t cover

the old machines in the installed base, since we needed a
specific software status. Even where old machines could have
been retrofitted we didn’t do that. We made a cut. (Gamma)
High product life times have an impact on the duration of
time you can do service for. Initially you have the challenge
to connect your big, relatively old installed base – and to
what cost! If you can only transmit essential signals you have
to ask yourself the question whether they are enough to offer
preemptive services. (Epsilon)

Unclear legal status of the information: Not
surprisingly, the use of the industrial data represents
significant challenges.
Data belongs to the customer. Software, however, is our
intellectual property. (Delta)
Data that we receive from the customer is our property.
However, we are under the obligation not to share the data
with third parties. That’s clear, that’s an obligation.
(Gamma)

Inability to build value propositions: As a prerequisite for value communication, the companies face
challenges in actually understanding what is valuable
for their customers and building value propositions
accordingly. Effective value propositions address
customer’s timely business goals, and offer tangible
evidence of value:
We had data but didn’t really know what to do with it.
You have to understand the customers’ business, their pain.
You have to connect an idea with this customer pain.”
(Delta).
The assumption that we know what to do and what the
customer should do has failed. These things [Smart Services]
have to be jointly developed. (Delta).
We are really struggling to develop a value proposition.
This technology is just emerging, developing. (Delta)

Inability to communicate value: The existing
customer relationships have been built around
(physical) products and product innovations. The
customer-facing staff lacks the confidence and
capabilities to communicate value.
Our dealers cannot argument professionally. [...] They
cannot conduct a professional sales pitch with arguments.
They can all sell a [conventional product]. But I personally
do not believe that they can sell one of todays’ [products].
These include such advanced features you wouldn’t believe it.
(Delta).
Also, we have the status quo of today, and we know what
comes in one year, but our sales people that talk to the
customer, they rather want to talk about horsepower and
kilowatts than these new technologies. (Delta).
Our dealers did not use the time to convey positive
experiences to demonstrate value. (Delta)

4.3

External barriers

Industrial buying culture and relationships:
Smart services represent a high-value offering with
potential for improved profits for all stakeholders.
Smart service provision also requires a significant
upfront investment from the supplier company, hence
requiring higher profitability to compensate for the
investment. However, often the existing relationships
and the prevailing industrial procurement culture favor
short-term wins, exercise of high buyer-power, and
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cost-based pricing. The focus is on transactional
efficiency and arms-length relationships. The value
focus of the smart services is often not aligned with the
price focus of the industrial buying.

solution scope. What represents an undividable bundle
of activities, capabilities and resources for a customer,
may include undesirable demands for the service
provider.

It is difficult to get money from the customer for Smart
Services. [...] In addition, many topics are so intermingled
that you cannot always strictly separate them. [...] Because
of this, we have miscellaneous products that overlap a bit.
(Epsilon).
With an old family business in Europe, customer
relationship is everything – personal contacting, personal
guidance. They only see value when someone is there
personally. He doesn’t see value when someone he doesn’t
know does something with a computer and then sends a huge
bill. (Delta).
Full-Service packages are mixed calculations. Costs
arise when customers use the product until it is broken. With
smart services, I can see problems before it breaks. To
develop the business case and show value from reducing
secondary damage, that is our job. (Delta)

Customers have never told us what they expect. They only
tell us when expectations haven’t been met. – The customers
are not communicating specific numbers because he is
unaware of them. But inwardly he has expectations that are
based on experiences that he had. (Delta).
The customer expects that our [Smart Services] are so
capable software-wise, that the integration of all his different
software systems works. Linking data to the customer in his
way of expressing himself and for different systems is the
biggest challenge, for this we need IT from external
professionals. (Delta).
Preventive maintenance will lead to fewer direct contacts
with the customer. [...] At some point, the customer will say‚
this is too expensive’ – because he doesn’t have any machinedown experiences any longer. (Delta).
Customer expectations are clear. If these cannot be met
adequately with the current offering, we are deliberately nontransparent with our customers. Arising issues are avoided
by offering all-in packages that transfer potential risks from
customer to us. (Delta).

Smart services generally require a long-term
orientation to customer relationships and high levels of
trust and openness.
There is this permanent fear to be liable to recourse, that
someone takes customer’s data. This fear is crippling. We do
everything in our power to have legal security, to close all
loopholes – and to tell everything that we know our customer.
For instance, data does not go to the US. That simply won’t
work. (Delta).
Data security was a huge issue – so we trained our
employees regarding the topic. We defined clear rules for
each [smart service] session: The customer initiates it, and
the customer ends it. [...] We obligated ourselves not to
analyze any data, except the customer gives his express
permission. This way we established trust. (Gamma).
Data security is the biggest issue in Germany and in
Europe. We have found in many surveys that customers are
highly critical regarding unrestricted access to their data.
(Delta)

The Table 2 summarizes the internal barriers,
resource and capability gaps, and external barriers to
implementing smart services.
Table 2. Internal barriers, capability
gaps, and external barriers to adoption of
smart services
Internal
barriers

Resource and
capability gaps

External
barriers

Management
culture,
Identity,
Legitimacy

Inability to provide
smart services,
Access to
influence,
Governance
infrastructure, Lack
of resources,
Insufficient
information on
installed base,
Cost-benefit of
installed base
modernization,
Unclear legal status
of the information,
Inability to build
value propositions,
Inability to
communicate value

Industrial
buying culture
and
relationships,
Reputation and
brand image,
Unwillingness
to outsource,
Non-matching
solution visions

Reputation and brand image: For many of the
case companies their existing brand as a product
company, as well as the reputation as service provider
represent a significant perceptional barrier to
overcome.
We are perceived as a product company by our
customers, less as a solution or service provider. (Beta)

Unwillingness to outsource: Service provision
most of often involves change in the organizational
boundaries: the customer outsources a business
function to the supplier. Customers are often unwilling
to give up resources and capabilities, fearing future loss
of competitive advantage, unhealthy dependence, and
similar consequences.
[Our customers] don’t want to be dependent at the
moment because they are afraid to lose capabilities to
maintain and service their machines on their own. However, I
think there will be change in the next couple of years due to
cost pressure as well as rising complexity of systems that
necessitate highly trained specialists. (Alpha)

Non-matching solution visions: Perhaps relating
to the inability to build value propositions, customers
and service suppliers often have deviating views on

5.

Discussion

Our study investigates the emerging smart service
business offering among six cases. Industrial service
providers are responding to the changing needs of
customers and emerging market opportunities by
overcoming internal barriers and building new
capabilities. In order to understand which factors seem
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to inhibit the change we analyzed the change process in
great detail. Our analysis identified three internal
barriers, nine resource and capability gaps, and four
external barriers to the adoption and implementation of
smart services within the industry. Thus quantitatively,
the biggest set of barriers seem to lie in the resources
and capabilities and in more detail the lack of
managerial cognition of reconfiguration and
disengagement.

5.1

Theoretical implications

We build our analysis of the findings on the
interplay between two organizational theories, the
institutional logic [7] and dynamic capabilities [12],
(see also [6]). First, within individual firms, the
transformation requires change in the attitudes, beliefs,
and norms that shape the business practices [34]. Gioia
and Thomas [36] concluded that to induce change, the
organization must be destabilized and convinced that
there is a necessity for a different way of seeing and
being. Drawing on the conceptualization of
organizational and strategic change [37], this first stage
of transformation is about “unfreezing” the current
beliefs, attitudes, norms, and schemes of reasoning by
managerial sensegiving. At this stage the processes
should focus on motivating the need to change and
communicating the new inspiring vision. Managers
must create urgency for change. A rather common
sensegiving strategy portrays the current (product)
offering as becoming commoditized, leading to loss of
competitiveness and low profitability. Then, from the
capability perspective, our findings indicate that the
case companies have deeply rooted routines and
capabilities to effectively conduct their established
business. Hence, the current (operational) capabilities
and resources of the organizations likely feature high
technical fitness, but deteriorating evolutionary fitness
[12]. Agarval and Helfat [38] define strategic renewal
of an organization to include the process of
replacement of attributes of an organization that have
the potential to substantially affect its long-term
prospects. We conclude that managers may need to
divest current operational capabilities and resources to
create room for new operational capabilities with
higher evolutionary fitness. Otherwise the firms would
continue maintaining unprofitable technically fit
routines, resources, and capabilities. Based on our
findings, a salient example of the high technical but
low evolutionary fitness is the sales function, which in
many industrial companies have over time developed
effective product sales practices, but which are
becoming increasingly dysfunctional in meeting the
new demands.
The next stage in strategic renewal is about building
a shared vision and new capabilities, routines, and
resources to implement the new vision. The new vision
needs to motivate the desirability of new smart services
among the organizational actors. The greatest challenge
for the managers during the this stage is to mobilize the
firm’s dynamic capabilities to modify and extend its

resource and capability base, and build entirely new
resources and capabilities, to achieve evolutionary
fitness. Our findings illustrate the magnitude of the
challenge. Among many things, corporate training
programs and incentive structures continue maintaining
the established capabilities. Among the key capabilities
to overcome the identified internal challenges is to
align governance and incentives with the new vision,
invest in value-based selling capabilities to build and
communicate value [16], industrialize [19] the service
provision, and segment to choose right customers for
the smart services approach.
Finally, the third “refreezing” stage involves
influencing and accelerating the institutional change of
beliefs and accepted business models and relationships
within the surrounding business ecosystem to create
receptivity for the new relationship logic, and align the
visions about what is proper and “right” way to
conduct business in the industry. Smart services as
novel offerings require convincing proof of customer
value. Hence, smart services are frequently a part of a
broader, value-based strategy. As an example
sensegiving strategy, Zeta has a established a global
function to promote value-based relationships in
industry events, and produce whitepapers, seminars,
books, industrial benchmarking studies, and quantified
reference stories to influence industrial relationship
practices. To gain profound understanding of their
customers and market opportunities, the case
companies study their customer’s business processes
and business drivers to identify and assess novel
opportunities for value creation. Simultaneously, firms
need to focus on internal exploitation efficiency and
institutionalization of the new practices, resources, and
(operational) capabilities to create a lasting impact.
While the reconfiguration and development of new
operational capabilities may have improved the
evolutionary fitness of the firm, the technical fitness of
the new capabilities and resources likely needs
attention. The Table 3 summarizes our framework by
explaining the different stages of transformation, as
well as dividing the stages into institutional and
capability related transformative actions.
Table 3. Stages of overcoming barriers
to change.
Unfreezing
Institutional
perspective
Capability
perspective
Building
Institutional
perspective
Capability
perspective

Managerial sensegiving to create
urgency for change
Divesting existing capabilities and
resources to enable adoption of
new capabilities and resources
Managerial sensegiving for new
shared vision
Application of the firm’s dynamic
capabilities to reconfigure and
renew the capability and resource
base

Refreezing
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Institutional
perspective
Capability
perspective

5.2

Influencing industry-wide beliefs
and norms to build receptivity for
smart services
Refining operational capabilities
for exploitation efficiency

Managerial Implications

Our findings illustrate the impact of digitalization
on industrial services, and contribute to the discussion
of digitalization of industrial operations, service
transformation, and the interplay between institutional
change and dynamic capabilities to achieve
organizational change (Table 3).
For practicing managers the implications are rather
straightforward: to achieve the potential of smart
services, the managers need to engage in sensegiving to
overcome the prevailing beliefs and rules, and prepare
to renew the organizational capabilities and resources,
focusing especially on the governance, incentives, and
value-based capabilities, processes, and tools. It is also
important to acknowledge, as our findings illustrate,
that smart services are not just something to add on, but
a part of a broader, paradigmatic change in industrial
relationships and business models, and hence require
simultaneous change in industrial beliefs, norms, and
practices within the business ecosystem. Progressive
companies need to effectuate the change within their
network.
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